I’m hardly the only one who’s noticed the evolutionary origins of morality. I’m not even the only one who’s put two and two together and realized that, as a consequence, objective morality is a chimera. Edvard Westermarck arrived at the same conclusion more than a century ago, pointing out the impossibility of truth claims about good and evil. Many of my contemporaries agree on these fundamental facts. However, it would seem that very few of them agree with me on the implications of these truths for each of us as individuals.
Consider, for example, a recent post by Michael Shepanski, entitled Morality without smoke, that appeared on his blog Step Back, Step Forward. Shepanski appears to have no reservations about the evolutionary origins of morality, noting that those origins don’t imply the Hobbesian conclusion that all human behavior is motivated by self-interest:
To begin, human nature is not the horrible thing that some have imagined. I’m looking at you, Thomas Hobbes:
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.
That was written in 1651, and since then we have learnt something about evolutionary psychology. It turns out that our genes have equipped us with more than narrow self-interest: we come with innate tendencies towards (among other things) altruism, empathy, loyalty, and retribution. Also society has systems of rewards and punishments to keep us mostly in line, whether we’re innately disposed to it or not.
Shepanski also appears to accept the conclusion that, as a result of the evolutionary origins of morality, all the religious and secular edifices concocted so far as a “basis” for it are really just so much smoke. However, he denies the implication that this implies the “end of morality.” Rather, he would prefer a “morality without smoke,” meaning one that doesn’t have a “mystical foundation.” The problem is that he has no such morality to offer:
About now, you might expect me to put forward some non-mystical basis for morals: something from science perhaps. No, that is not my plan. I don’t believe it’s possible. I’m with the philosopher David Hume, who said we can never reason from matters of fact alone to a moral conclusion: we can’t derive an “ought” from an “is”.
I agree with Shepanski about the lack of an objective, or “smoke-free” basis for morality, and I also agree that the lack of such a basis does not imply the “end of morality.” Morality certainly isn’t going anywhere, regardless of the musings of the philosophers. It is part of our nature, and a part that we could not well do without even if that were possible, which it isn’t. This is where things really get interesting, however, and not just in the context of Shepanski’s paper, but in general. What are the consequences of the facts set forth above? What “should” we do in view of them? What do they imply in terms of how individuals should interpret their own moral emotions?
According to Shepanski,
And I agree with Hume because (a) as a matter of logic, I don’t see how you can ever get a conclusion that uses the moral words (“ought”, “should”, “good”, “evil” etc.) from premises that don’t use those words (unless the conclusion is completely vacuous), and (b) to my knowledge, no-one has ever found a way around Hume’s law (and even if some ingenious workaround can be found, we don’t want to put morality on hold while we’re waiting for it).
Summing up so far: basing morals on mysticism is noxious, and basing morals on science alone looks impossible. What next?
Tell the truth? Accept the fact that objective morality is as imaginary as Santa Claus, and consider rationally where we go from there? Well, not quite. Again quoting Shepanski,
When you get to that point, and someone asks you what your moral bedrock is based on, my advice is: don’t answer. Keep mum. Better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak and remove all doubt. Zip it. (Or if you really must have some words to fill an awkward conversational silence, then it’s probably harmless to say any of the following: “It’s a deeply held personal belief,” “It’s just the way I was brought up,” or “These truths we hold to be self-evident”. Just don’t attempt a real defense: don’t attempt to deduce your moral bedrock from anything else.)
In other words, as my old drama teacher used to put it, “Ad lib!” Just make sure you never reveal the little man behind the curtain. Manipulate moral emotions to your heart’s content, but just make sure you never tell the truth. Of course, this “solution” is very convenient for the “experts on ethics.” They get to continue pretending that they’re actually experts about something real. That, of course, is exactly what the legions of them plying their trade in academia and elsewhere are doing as I write this.
As I pointed out above, what’s interesting about Shepanski’s take on morality is that he derives it from the same basic facts as my own. In short, he realizes that there is no such thing as objective morality, and he knows that morality is the expression of evolved behavioral traits in creatures with large brains, capable of reasoning about what their moral emotions are trying to tell them. As he puts it:
Without smoke, moral principles are pegged to one thing only: our willingness to accept their consequences. Which consequences we are willing to accept is determined, to a large extent, by our evolved psychological tendencies, including altruism, empathy, and self-interest. Within the human species these evolved tendencies are probably more similar than different, so there is hope that our moral principles will converge. Reasoning with one other…, can bring the convergence forward.
Is that really what we “ought” to do? Embrace a future in which the best manipulators of moral emotions get to guide their “convergence” to whatever end state they happen to prefer? I can’t answer that question. Like Shepanski, I lack any “bedrock” basis for telling anyone what they “ought” to do as a matter of principle. When it comes to “oughts,” I must limit myself to suggesting what they “ought” to do as a mere matter of utility in order to best achieve goals that, for one reason or another, happen to be important to them. With that caveat, I suggest that they ought not to follow Shepanski’s advice.
If human morality is really the expression of evolved behavioral traits, as Shepanski and I both agree, than those traits didn’t just suddenly pop into existence. Perhaps, like the human eye, they arose from extremely primitive origins, and were gradually refined to their present state over the eons. Regardless of the precise sequence of events, it’s clear that they evolved in times radically different from the present. If they evolved, then they must have had some survival value at the time they evolved. It is certainly not obvious, and indeed it would be surprising, if they were similarly effective in promoting our survival today. One can cite many examples in which they appear to be accomplishing precisely the opposite, leading to what I have referred to elsewhere as “morality inversions.”
In other words, while I think it likely that most of us have some subjective notion of purpose, of the meaning of life, of aspirations or goals that are important to us, I very much doubt that a “convergence” of morality will prove to be the most effective way for most of us to achieve those ends. In the first place, manipulating atavistic emotions strikes me as a dangerous game. In the second, human moral emotions don’t promote “convergence.” As Sir Arthur Keith pointed out long ago, they are dual in nature, and include an innate tendency to identify an outgroup, whose members it is natural to despise and hate. One need only glance through the comment section of any blog or website hosted by some proponent of the “brotherhood of man” to find abundant artifacts of the intense hatred felt for the ideological “other.” Hatred of the “other” has been with us throughout recorded history, is alive and well today, especially among those of us who most pique themselves on their superior piety and moral purity, and will certainly continue to be a prominent trait of our species for a long time to come.
What do I suggest as a more “useful” approach than Shepanski’s “convergence?” The truth is always a good place to start. We have the misfortune to live in an age dominated by Puritans in both the traditional spiritual and modern secular flavors. Their demands to be taken seriously as well as the wellsprings of such power as they possess is absolutely dependent on maintaining the illusion that there are such things as objective good and evil. As a result, promoting a general knowledge and appreciation of the consequences of the truth won’t be easy. It will entail pulling the rug out from under these obscurantists. Beyond that, we need to restrict morality to the limits within which we can’t do without it, such as the common, day-to-day interactions of human beings. My personal preference would be to come up with a common morality that limits the harm we do to each other as much as possible, while at the same time leaving each of us as free as possible to pursue whatever goals in life we happen to have.
None of the above are likely to happen anytime soon. No doubt that will come as some comfort to those who “feel in their bones” that good and evil are real things, independent of the human minds that concoct them. Still, it seems that there’s an increasing tendency, at least in some parts of the world, for people to jettison the silly notion of God into the same realms as Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny. If that trend is any indication, perhaps there is at least a ray of hope.